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ABSTRACT
A simple analytical framework is used to consider alternative exchange
rate regimes and their bearing on macroeconomic management of a semi—
industrial economy. The emphasis is on the implications of different
degrees of capital mobility. Oneofthe topics taken up is the conflict
between the role of the real exchange rate as a signalling device for
long—run resource allocation and the problem of real exchange rate appre-
ciation accompanying the opening up of an economy to short—term capital
inflow. Also discussed is the related choice of exchange rate policy as
an anti—inflation device.
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I.Introduction1
The semi-industrialized economy to be discussed here mainly imports
rawmaterialsand capital goods and is past the stage of using quantita-
tive restrictions for import substitution of consumer goods.Traditionally
it depended mainly on primary exports and is now rapidly moving into
industrial exports.While it nay still have a multiple protective tariff
system and thus be more 'closed' in the real sense than some optimum degree
of free trade might dictate, it will rely quite heavily on the use of the
formalexchange rate system to handle current account problems.
The typical problem for such an economy, unless it happens to be an
oil exporter, ishowto manageitsexchange rate and internal macro-
policiesover time in face of a large structural deficit, as part of its
long-run trade and development strategy.
Under reasonable assumptions it will be an optimal strategy for this
economy to borrow abroad to finance a large deficit in the early stages of
industrialization, use these funds to develop its exports, providing the
internal rate of return lies above the marginal social cost of foreign
borrowing.Subsequently it will pay back these loans as the economy approaches
independence.In the course of the growth process the real effective ex-
change rate will usually be required to grow over time, and it should do so
at a rate that equals the difference between the internal and external real
rate of return to capital (see Bruno 1976).This statement must be modified
in the case in which relative technical progress in export -ascompared to
home -industries(or when the country's relative export price in world
markets) is sufficiently high to make actual growth in the real exchange
rate unnecessary. Even then it is usually the case that a real exchange
rate level has to be maintained over time.-2-
Governments, ofcourse, seldom knOw how to sol VC Optimalty prohlems,
'or dothey know thepathoflong-run foreign credit availabilities with
ny certainty.1ore often than not, they have to live from hand to mouth.
Yet the logic of theoretical constructs may still be followed in at least
some respects.The marginal cost of foreign loans must not exceed the
internal profitability of the resul tingi nvestment and thetar-i ff (or subsidy)
inclusivereal exchange rate must be related to the sueof the allowable
structuraldeficit.The main point is that there should be a clear long-
run relationship between the ratio of present andfuture real exchange rates
and between the internal and external real rates of interest.These
simultaneouslyaffect long—run borrowing, domestic savings and investment
policies as well as the real exchange rate as an allocative device.
Problems occur when short-term market prices do not give the 'correct'
long-run allocation signals for producers or consumers.Two major sources
for such discrepancy may arise in the present context, both working in the
same direction.The world financial market may temporarily register very
low (or even negative) real rates of interest for short and medium run
loans2, as it has done for some time in the 1970s and untilvery recently.
The other, often more important, problem is that domestic stabilization
policy with its associated restrictive monetary policy, may cause the real
marginal cost of domestic credit to rise considerably above the desired
long-run rate.Either one of these or.a combined opening up of the gap
between the two interest rate signals will, in the absence of other inter-
vention, causesubstantial short-run capital inflows and a real appreciation
of the exchange rate, depressing manufacturing exports and profits, an
experience recently shared by a number of countries in the Latin American
Continent3 andelsewhere.
Prolonged periods of real exchange appreciation accompanying short-run
capitalinflow, whenthe long-run horizon dictates the converse, may not be—3-
hainfulfrom the point ofviewof financial portfolio allocations. These
are easily reversed at the cost of a phone call.They may, however, be
costly in terms of irreversible production and invesijient decisions, which
by nature have long gestation periods.This argument, of course, depends
on some myopia in the expectation formation process of investors. Given
the market inperfections in a typical semi-industrialized country this is
areasonable assumptionto make.
Thistype of conflict between short-term and long-term asset pricing
alsoraises thequestionof financial openness, as distinct fromreal openness
ofa country. Real openness relates to the degree of substitutability
of goods across borders and the efficiency advantages to be reaped from
reducing intervention in the free flow of real trade.Financial openness
has to do with the substitutability of foreign and domestic financial assets
and the extent of interference with free capital mobility.Since the ex-
change rate enters the pricing of both tradeable assets and tradeable goods
conflicts of price signalling may occur when financial openness is pursued
along with real openness.
Weshallassume here that the problem of relating long-term borrowing
(andinvestment) to the development strategy has somehow been taken care of
and we may, for our purposes, consider the long-run capital imports as largely
determined outside the present framework.This leaves the question of
opennesstoward the world financial market for short-run capital movements.
Also, how does financial, as distinct from real, openness relate to the
operation of the economy under alternativ exchange rate regimes?
After laying out a simple analytical framework (Section II) we shall
consider the main alternative exchange rate regimes and their bearing on
macroeconomic management in the light of the extent of real and financial
opennessof thecountry.The regimes to be considered areafixed peg,
withor without a 'crawling' commercial policy, the crawling poj, and theIil3naged float (Sections I1I—V).This being a conference on the capital
market, we shall putthenain eniphasisontheimplicationsof di fferent
degrees of capital mobility tinder theseregimes.
There is a separatequestion of howtheextent of real and financial
openness restricts or enhancesdomesticstabilization policy.Thus for
brief transition periods itnaypayto use theexchange rateas a price
stabilizing device, even at thecostof 'wrong'long-termsignalling. The
lastsection (VI) considers the two—iayrelationship of exchange—rate
adjusnentand the inflationary process.Should the exchangerate always
accommodate to the inflation rate (or overtakeit), or can it sometimes
be used in the opposite direction tornoderatean excessive rate of inflation?
While this and other problems seem to bea hot subject of debate in
theLatin American scene, I do not pretend to knowenough about the empirical
background of these countries in order togo into analysis of actual
examples.The discussion has partly been inspired by theexperiences of
myown country (see also Bruno and Sussrnan,1979, 1980) which hopefully may
alsobe relevant to a wider set of countries.
II. Analytical framework
Wecanrepresent the general equilibrium of the economy in a diagram
in which the real exchange rate (q =e/p) and real money balances (m = M/p)
appearonthe two axes.4 Weshallconsider the commodity market, asset
supplyand demand, and the balance of payments.
Coimnod i ties
Suppose the economy produces a composite good (Q), pricedp. which is
an imperfect substitute with a world export good priced abroadat p* =
Exportswill be a positive function of their relativeprices, q(l +tx),
where q (=p e/p) is thereal exchange rate andt is a possible export
subsidy. Imports (N) in this economy are assumed to be an imput into the
productive system, together with labour (L), and capital(K), i.e. we have-
Q Q(L,N, K).rhe short-run 5upply function is given by
QS[J
q(l + t)p; where w is the real wye ( W/p), isa tariff
rate and p is the relative world price of the import. Domestic absorption
depends on real income, the realmorleysupply (m = M/p), expected inflation
( and a fiscal impact variable (g).
Under the usual assumptions we can represent the excess demand for goods
in the form:
()QdQSf(qm;u)
whereU1 stands for a vector of various exogenous shift factors (g, w,
t,t,-K).6
The downward-slopedcurve QQ inFigure 1 gives the combinations of real
exchange rate and real balances that keep the comnodity market in equilib-
rium (Qd =QS)• It will shift inwards with an increase in the government
deficit (g), the real wage (w), expected inflation (r),orany of the other
factors listed under U1.Above the curve there is excess demand and prices
will tend to increase; below it there is excess supply and prices may or
may not decrease depending on price stickiness.Since the price level
appears in the denominator of both variables on the axes, the movement of
prices in this diagram will always take place along a 450 vector, towards
the QQ curve.
The_basic_balance
The basic balance (T1) will here be defined as the difference between
exports and current import requirements plus exogenously given long-run
capital flows (F).
The reason fordistinguishingbetween current importrLquir1ents and
whatare normally registered as imports is to separate outthe Irdng
elementin importsand addit to the capital account.Thus, iiurt
inventory niovementswillbea formofaviuys(na di ticn a bi eg rtof
i nvestinent). Theideaofceparatngcut art of pi telarts :5ut S
inthe currentaccount is meanttodistiFIJI ish 1et en icrg rUn t:n' 1erand loanswhich areusuallyhandled and determinedcentrallyby goVernments
andwill riot affect private sector wealthdirectly, and short-term capital
flows (and changes in exchangereserves) which aretheonly ones to be con-
sidered endogenous here.For simplicity, we assume F to includeforeign
investment and to be defined netof interestpayments on the outstanding
debt.





U2is another vector of exogenous shift factors(F, t, t)
Current account balance is represented by thehorizontal line in Figure
1, ata given real exchange rateq0 = e0/p0.Below the line there is a
deficit in the basic balance(T1 <0), above it thereis a surplus (T >0).
The adjustment whenoutof balance depends on the total balance-of—payment
positionand the exchange rate regime of which discussion isdeferred for
the moment. The NX line shifts up with a fall in For an overall reduction
in import tariffs and export subsidies.8
Money and other assets
There are three kinds of privately-held assets in thesystem in
addition to the capital stock: government bonds(B9) carrying a nominal
interest rate i, domestic money (M), and aforeign currency denominated
asset (Z).The latter could, in principle, includepaper money, an interest-
bearing asset (net of debt and carrying an interest ratei*), or inventories
of imported goods.For simplicity, we shall ignore the foreign interest
rate and only take into account the expected rate of devaluation
(E).
Money demand (Md) is a negative function of the nominal rate of interest
(1) and is proportional to gross output (Q).The money market is in
equilibrium with given money supply (11).
(3) 11d1 =()Q=-7-
For highrates ofexpectedinflationmay be substituted fori in (3).
Asis usually assumed, only drjmestic residents hold M, while both domestic
and foreign residents may hold 7.The relative demand for the foreign
asset(7d) is assumedto take the following simple form (see 1iles 1978;
Calvo and Rodriguez 1971):
(4) ezd/Mdqzdimd k(s)
whereqc/p asbefore, and c is theexpectedrate of depreciation.9 The
moreelastick, the closer substitutes are M and 7.
Iftotal short—term foreign exchange assets hold in the economy are
B and Central Bank foreign exchange reserves are A, actual private assets
(Z)will always equal the difference Z =B—A. B may change only as a
result of an imbalance in the basic account as defined above, thus, it will
be assumed to be given at any moment of time.Foreign exchange reserves
(A) may or may not be determined by the Central Bank depending on the
foreign exchange regime (see below).
If both the markets for .1 and Z are in balance, equation (4) can be
turned into an asset market equilibrium relationship: q =mk(E)/(B-A).
This is represented by the line ZM in Figure 1.To allow for different
degrees of financial openness we assume that the actual change in the
privately—held foreign exchange asset (AZ) is proportional to the desired
change
-
Z0from any initial level, Z0= B
-
A0,
while the money market
(3) equilibrates. (This assumes that the bond market adjusts more slowly.)
(5) AZ = [k(c)m/q-
(B0 - A0)1
where 0.
The relationship between asset formation and the balance of payments
istakenup next.0- -
Thebalance of ayiiants
The balanceof payments consists of the sum of thebasicbalance
(Ti)
andtheshort-r-un capital account, which inturn equals the net sale
of private foreign-exchange assets(-AZ).The overall BoPsurplus
(1=1
+12) must equal thenet accumulation of Bank reserves (AA).We
canthus write:
(6) 1 = T1(q) + B-A - k(c)m/qJ = T(q, m; U3) = AA
whereU3 includes all theshiftvariables appearing inU2 as well as
(B0 - A0, —
The line ZM in Figure 1 represents the short-runcapital account
balance = 0).Its slope is k(r)/(B0 -A0).Above it 12 > 0 and below
itT2
<0. The curve TI which represents the overall balance(T =0)must
lie between the lines NX and ZM.Below it I <0and above it I >0.
This two-part graphical representation of theBoP, which was inspired
by Frenkel and Rodriguez (1980), is also useful forconsidering different
degrees of capital niobility.1°A very low level of(relatively flat TI
curve) would correspond to the case ofrather effectiveexchange control.
In the extreme case (= 0),only the current account matters.The other
polar extreme (= ) isthe one in which only asset behaviour
(12 0)
matters. There is instantaneous adjustment of z to (as in Dornbusch
1976).
The banking balance sheet
We end this preliminary description bystating the basic balance-
sheet restriction of the banking system, within whichmonetary policy
operates. Denoting Central Bank credit to the government byC9, to the
private sector by C, and private banking credit to theprivate sector by
we have:-9-.
(1) McAC9 C +C.
Forsubsequent reference wealso note that by adding the net foreign
exchange asset eZ to theLHS of (7)andremembering that A + Z=B we get
anotherconstraint on the sum of the two assets.
(8) M feZ =eB+C
where CCg 1C
+C
is total bank credit.
III.Ope ingaF rLimitedatal Mobility
Wefirst considerthe process of large step adjustment of the exchange
ratein response to shifts in the basic balance under a pegged exchange
rateregime. An important issue in the present context is the limitation
imposed by the role of expectations of exchange rate change and of short-run
capital movements even when the economy is relatively (though not absolutely)
closed to financial capital movements.These pose considerable short—term
stabilization problems, especially for monetary policy.Let us discuss
these problems and possible remedies.
Consider a fixed exchange-rate economy with initial equilibrium at a
nominal exchange rate e0, quantity of money M0, and price level p0 (see
Figure 2). Cormmodity market equilibrium is given by the curve QQ, the basic
balance is given by NX.There is limited capital mobility (low ), so that
the balance of payments equilibrium is given by the line TI whose slope is
assumed to be between 0 and 1.There are given low expectations of exchange-
rate change ( which may be zero).Suppose now that for some reason
there is a shift in the basic balance (NX shifts up) which may be due to a
long-term fall in lending (F).A real devaluation from q0 to q1 is called
for.For simplicityassume that the change is confined to the current
account andQQ is not ininediatelyaffected)2 A possible new equilibrium
for the economy would be at the pointB which is given at the intersection
ofNX' and the old ZM line, assuming that after the change its slope—10 —
- A) and Z rainthes.. A set of p'linestt ::ight bring
thiS about could be a cor:U nation of a no;i n31 doal uaticr to, fiscal
and incomes restraint, a reduction in g or w (shifting QQ toQQ'), plus
an increase in M toso that el/CO.Unless prices are do.n—
ward rigid the same real rovemorit in M/p and c/p could also be achieved by
afall in p. keeping M constant( Me), coupled with a smaller nominal
devaluation, lie ar-c less interested inthe exact final outcome but rather
in the dynamic sequenceof events that maytypically occur once the need
for a step devaluation is signalled.
It is in the nature of a fixed exchange-rate regime that there is a
considerable lag between the first signal of a required change in e and the
actual act of a devaluation, let alone the implementation of the internal
demand restrictions that have to accompany it.The moment tr shifts towards
if' andforeign exchange reserves start falling (AA <0), two processesmay
be set in riotion, the one having to do with expectations, the other with
fluctuationsin the money base.As expectations of a devaluation rise
(c1 > o' there is import hoarding and delayed repatriation of export
proceeds. The asset equilibrium curve rotates upwards to ZM',say,with
the balance of payments equilibrium line shifting to TT".The result is
a more intensive fall in reserves than would otherwise take place, signalling
a larger devaluation than may objectively be required.
This can be illustrated as follows: given the expectation of a
devaluation, a new temporary equilibrium could take place at the point H.
One way of exactly reaching H could be a nominal devaluation from A to G
keeping M constant, followed by a price increase (due to an inflationary
gap in the goods market) which is represented by an inward move along a 450
vector from G to H.Whether the real exchange rate is above or below the
level balancing the new basic account (NX') depends on the extent of the
excessive expectations-induced shift of IT" which, in turn, depends on the
assetdemand response to expectations change (k/3c) and theeffectiveness—1 I
of foreign exchangecontrol(E) .Once a icvlutionhs t ' enplace,
expectations will stabilize again (at r, or soue lo';arrii:ber).Suppose
ZMreturns back to its previous position and BoPequilibriumis repre-
sented by TI'.At the point H, for example,there is nowasurplus with
renewedcapitalinflow (repatriation of export proceeds, dishoarding of
import inventories, etc.) whichmore thancompensates for the remaining
basic deficit, and reserves will start rising again.
So far we have ignored changes in nominal moneywhichcan he assumed
away only if there is Central Bank sterilization of the fluctuations in
exchange reserves.13This bringsusto the sc-cord dynamic process which
naytakeplace simultaneously with the previously described one. Let us
go back to the point A when foreign exchange reserves start falling.
Unless sterilized, there will be a fall in M which in Figure 2 would show
as a horizontal leftward move from A towards D.Excess supply and unemploy-
ment develop unless prices (and wages) are downward flexible.Again, a
possible move under price fleibi1ity would be a fall in M by the amount
DA and a reduction of prices along a 450 vector from D to E.If expecta-
tions of a devaluation are kept at zero, the BoP would have reached temporary
equilibrium at E without a devaluation but through a monetary squeeze and
a forced deflation.
If prices are inflexible, the monetary contraction and the deepening
slump could in principle continue until an unemployment equilibrium is
reached at F.'4It is the capital flows in response to the interest rate
gap15 that will finance the basic deficit. Obviously, this is neither a
sustainable nor a socially desirable equilibrium.What usually happens is
that the internal pressure on the monetary authorities makes for monetary
expansion to counterbalance the loss of reserves.
The counterpart of this phenomenon, after an excessive devaluation, is
the reverse upward pressure on the money supply coming from the renewed
capital inflow and the rising reserves.Suppose we are temporarily at H-12-
when BoP equilibriumisgiven by TI'.tack of monetaryrestraint(and
legitimdte pressure on the part of sectors hurt by the real credit squeeze)
willcause Hto rise.In terms of Figure 2 therewillbe a movementalong
a horizontal line from H towards iT1.At the same time inflationary
pressuredevelops causing a rise in prices (move back towards QQ).
The large swings in short-runcapital movementsand in themoney pre—
and post- large devaluations are hard tocontain even underexchangecontrol
andconstitute one of their main drawbacks (see Bruno and Sussman1979, for
an account of the Israeli experience).The pressure to keep real money
and credit high (e.g. for investment) may cause a continued inflationary
process driving down the real exchange rate to a renewed BoP deficit, unless
the devaluation is coupledwith the appropriate measures that will shift QQ
outwards.16
If exchange controls are tight ( 0) andthe original level of real
balancesis desired,an equilibrium devaluation could be reached at C pro-
viding there is a sufficient accompanying budget cut to move the QQ line
through that point. If controls are not tight and there are capital flows,
temporary equilibrium could be reached at N, say, with a smaller budget
cut and smaller real devaluation.This, however, can only be temporary
since the current account deficit will gradually erode foreign exchange assets
and require further cuts in the budget deficit, and an additional increase
in c/p to make room for the expanded production of tradeable goods, as IT'
gradually shifts up.Only a larger budget cut to QQ' (and/or larger drop
in the real wage, coupled with a rise in m and q) can keep all markets in
new current-account equilibrium at the point B.
The main problems that arise in the operation of a fixed peg which is
adjusted in large jumps thus center around the sizeableaccompanying
fluctuationsin real reserves and in the money supply and the large one-time
adjustments requi rdinother expenditure items.The latter are unavoidablewdr my chmge rite regime since a rral rceteisfer 'illalys
be requi red (unless there is a slack in the system which can he diver ted to
the tra'ieable g ods sector).On the other hand,themonetary upheavals
aridtherealloss of reserves could in principle be delayed if the real
exchangerate corrections areconfined to the current account.Shortof
moving to a regimeof small-step adjustient in the formal rate one nay
operate the fixed formal peg on capital account transactions while correcting
the real effective exchange rate in smaller steps through adjustments in
commercial policy.
Consider the case in which we have a pure dual rateon thetwo accounts
--a uniform tariff(tn) on importsand a subsidy of the same rate (t=t)
onexports.When F falls,as in the above discussion, one could in
principle increase t and t so as to keep the N line in place, while
manipulatingthe budget so asto compensate for the loss in revenue (when
thebalance is in deficit).In that case the economy may stay in equilibrium
at A while at the same time reducing the basic deficit.
Countries hardly ever operate a uniform tariff rate on imports. However,
aclose substitute for the above idea is a flat export subsidy based on value
added.Israel had operated such a system quite successfully through the
l960s and part of the 1970s.Large devaluations would take place only once
every few years and in between the rate of export subsidy (and sometimes also
the tariff rate on imports) would be adjusted upwards gradually.The
problem with such a system is usually twofold.One is that it tends to get
abused once the subsidy rate reaches high levels.There is considerable
incentive to cheat in the calculation of value added which leads to trade
distortions and the like.The other difficulty is that such measures
usually meet with strong disapproval of theinternationalagencies (GATT, THE).
It can be claimed that whenused in small measure andwith some prudence
such asystem may nonetheless have its merits.The alternatives, as we
shall see, have their drawbacks too.-14-
IV.The rrosaid Cons of a Cra:iing Peg
We now keep the assumption of a formalpeg but assume that the adjust-
merits are made in very small steps and at frequent intervals.11
The advantage of a crawling peg over the previous regime lies in the
two areas where the large-step adjustment regime is weakest. It usually
avoids the political and social tabu attached to an act ofcurrency
depreciation and shifts the exchange rate adjustments from the frontpages
of the newspaper to back-page financial columns.The majorexchange reserve
crisesand monetary upheavals may be avoided.
One by-product of the crawling peg is that no major political decisions
or restrictive internal policies have to be taken at each step.This
apparent advantage of mini-devaluations may paradoxically sometimes also be
a source of major weakness.In a government-deficit and inflation-prone
economy the operation of the exchange rate is delegated to a ministerial or
Bank committee without the accompanying continuousurge for small-step
fiscal and incomes policy discipline.18The fact that devaluations now take
on a more continuous form make for built-in inflationary expectations
(i11 = c = e/e),thus exacerbating inflationary pressures.
Under a crawling peg, especially if i.t is predetermined, the capital
account curve no longer fluctuates.Suppose expectations are fixed at
and the relevant asset demand curve is ZNI' in Figure 2, with equilibrium
momentarily at K.Say a small step adjustment to a new BoP curve IT" is
required.The small triangle marked by the points K, L, H marks the policy
trade—offs. If fiscal policy can be used along with a mini-devaluation we
may move from K to L or at least refrain from getting a fall in real balances
(i.e. maintain real credit levels).If fiscal or real wage restraint
cannot take place, real money balances will have to fall as we move from K
to H, by a cut in nominal money, by inflation, or by both.One of the
problemsof the crawling peg is the continuous built-in pressure for monetaryrestraint to eep doiestic iriteret rates highreldtiveto (j* ).This
isshon by the fact that at theiointK on LM' , inhasto be lover than at
Norat B.
V. High Capital Mobility and Flexible Rates
So farwehave considered regimesinwhich the authorities directly
peg the exchange rate in which case the BoP neednotbe in momentary equi]i
brium and foreign exchange reserves are the shortrun buffer.In the
Introductionweposed the problem of conflicting longterm and short—term
pricesignalling.This may occur in a situation of relatively high capital
mobilityand exchange rate flexibility, to which we now turn.Considerthe
casein which the exchange rate automatically adjusts to equilibrate the
exchange market. It helps to discuss first the case of a flexible rate
under perfect asset niobility ( =0)and no intervention (AA =0).
In an inflationary situation and when the foreign asset is highly liquid




rather than M as the financial instrument.The
commodity market equilibrium curve QQ can be expressed in teniis of cC/p
(instead of m) and e/p, keeping all other properties as before (see Figure 3).
The asset market curve can be transfonned by substituting from equation (8)
into (4) and writing =B-Ato get:
(9) c/p =_() C/p.
B -[1 + k(c)]A
Equation (9) is represented by the curve ZC in Figure 3 which has
analogous properties to the curve ZM.It is a ray through the origin
whose slope increases with candA and falls with B.Equilibrium takes
place at the intersection of the asset market line (ZC) and the com;odity
market QQ (point A).In case of a disturbance the exchange rate immediately
adjusts to equilibrate the asset market first.Consider, as before, the
case in which there is an increase in the basic deficit (NX to NX') andfor simplicity assuma first that there is nochange in the cc nodity market.
The only channel by which this may have an effecton the economy isthe
assetmarket, through a possible impact effect on expectations (c) and a
longer-runeffect on thetotal supply of foreign exchange assets(B).
Supposethere is a one-time effect on crotatingLCtoZC'.The nominal
(and real)echargeratewillovershoot to the point F and may quickly be
eroded by inflation with real appreciation moving theeconomyfrom Fto G
along the line ZC' .At the point G the BoP is in short-run equilibrium,
but thereisa sustained basic deficit.This may disappearover time only
graduallyas B falls and the ZC curve continues to rotate up;ards.Final
equilibriumwill takeplaceonly when the asset equilibrium line and the
cornmodity market line intersect at the newbasicbalance equilibrium (see
point C).The story is only slightly modified if weconsider that the
disturbancethat hasshifted the basic balance (NX) also shifts the
commoditymarket (e.g. shift of QQ toQ'Q'as would happen in the case of
an increase in import prices).
There aresome clear drawbacks to this automatic adjustment process.
One is thatinthe first stage there may be an excessiveprice increase
with no real benefits to the current account.This isonly one example of
the'overshooting' tendency of an exchange regime inwhich the asset market
•
takes a major role in the short-run determination of the exchange rate
(cf. Dornbusch, 1976, and the related literature).Similar effects charac-
• terize the case of unexpected domesticmonetarychanges.For example, a
monetary expansion from A to B raises expectations of a depreciation, causes
a jump of the exchange rate to the point F on LC', say, followed by inflation
(more from F to G).The case of monetarycontraction, from A to H, which
may be needed tocorrect a commodity market imbalance (at QQ')leadsto
an appreciation(point R) coupled with excessive unemplouent unless prices
aredownwardflexible.The main drawbackofasset market determination in the present context,
quite apart from overshooting, is that the process of adjustiient to a new
long-run situation may be much too slow.The real exchange rate that is
signalledby theassetmarket (at the point G, say) does notreflect the true
long—runrate from thepointof viewofreal resource allocation.Given
the gestatior lags of exports and of investment in export industries and the
imperfectionsin the expectation formation mechanism this would seem to be
the major cost of allowing short-run capital movements to determine the
exchange rate.
Oneway of avoiding this signalling problem is to impose a direct tax
on capital imports as wasdone ina recent Israeli episode (see Liviatan
1980; Bruno and Sussman 1980).In Figure 3 this can be shown by noting
that the imposition of a tax (T) on capital imports is the same as raising
the expected cost of foreign borrowing and thus causing the asset market
curve to rotate in the required direction (say, from ZC' to LCD). This
may not overcome the overshooting problem but may, at least, avoid over-
valuation of the currency.'9 A managed float, which takes the fonu of
intervention in the foreign exchange market, in principle works in the same
direction.Purchase of foreign exchange by the Central Bank raises foreign
exchange reserves (A) and also rotates ZC anti-clockwise.
What happens when capital mobility is not perfect and we don't have
instantaneous arbitrage?Overshooting will clearly be mitigated.Con-
sider again the case in which the current account flows also play a role in
the market. Suppose that with the projected increase in the basic deficit
BoP equilibrium is represented by the curve TI' (shifted from TT and
assuming no immediate change in expectations).Underafloat the exchange
ratejumps to D and then adjusts along TI' to G.Note that there is less
overshooting (and less inflation) in this case.If we now also assume a
shift in expectations, the new equilibrium will be at a higher point, G1,-13-
onQQ.Obviously,theflatteris theTI1 irie theimre iiiportent isthe
basic balance in the determination of marketsignalsand thecloser will
afloat bringus to the long-run signal.
Doesthis analysis imply that it isalways advantageous to control
capital movements, i.e., limit financialopenness for the sake of real
openness?One should be careful not to jurip tohasty conclusions.If
it were possible to draian absolute distinctionbetween short-run andlong-
runcapital movements in practice, then such a conclusionmayperhaps be
justified.However, we should hearin mind that theway we have dis—
tinguishedbetween capital movements in terms ofexogenously determined
long-run funds (F) and endogenous short-term capital issomewhatartificial.
Excessiveforeign-exchange control could also driveawaylegitimate long-
runcapital, which may thus affect the options for the realeconomy (i.e.
shift the NX curve).The costs and benefits must be weighedagainst each
other. In any case, the argument for financial closednessmay often be
confined to particular short-term situations.
VI. Exchange Rate Adjustnent and Inflation: Accommodationversus Mdratfôn
The last issue to be discussed briefly is therelationship between ex-
change rate change and inflation.This brings up the case in which short-
run stabilization may take the lead over long-runobjectives in exchange
rate pricing.Specifically, should the rate of devaluation always be made
to accommodate (or overtake) the inflation rate forthe sake of the long-run
external balance?Or are there situations in which itpays to moderate
exchange rate changes as a short-run stabilization deviceeven at the cost
of a real loss of reserves?
For simplicity we shall conduct the discussion interms of steady-
state rates of change, p and e, and assumeconsistency of expectations,
i.e. npand n= e.Cue basic siurt-term reiaticnhip bet:enteratr of iriflatiun nd
depreciationinan open economy can be derived from the coodityand
labourmarketsand representstheprice-wage-price dynamic adjustment
process.In reducedformthiscan bewritten as follows:
(10) p +ue
The tpath-through' coefficient aincorporatesthe role of the direct
and indirect import coeffici ent as iiell as the impi ied wage-price linkages.
aismost likely to be less than one, providing we c'o rot have 100 pem cent
indexation. The intercept summarizes the role of excessdemand factors
in thecommodityand labourmarkets as well as autonomous cost-push factors
(worldpriceof raw materials, indirect taxes onconsumer goods, etc.).2°
Equation(10) appears as the line PP in Figure4, with intercept ir
on the -axis and slope a < 1.Given any rate of depreciation (c)this
curve gives the implied inflation rate that will be propagated by the real
systemgiven its underlying behavioural and institutional parameters.This
inflation rate can in principle be lowered either by a reduction in the
extent of linkage (a)orby fiscal and other stabilization measures, lowering
Inpractice it is unlikely that the slope can be changed much (except
momentarily under special circumstances), while the intercept of the PP line
is more amenable to policy change.
LineXXin Figure 4represents the long -run real depreciation that keeps
thecurrent account inbalance.The intercept 0 (which may be zero or
even negative) reflects the effect of the expected long-run reduction in
capitalflows net of autonomous time-shifts in the basic balance (due to
productivity growth, relative world price changes, etc.).2'
A crawl that achieves steady state equilibrium under these assumptions
is given at the rate c2,whichis consistent with an inflation rate of iT2
(see point A in the diagram).More restrictive internal policies (showing
in a lower pp' curve) will allow a lower rate of dereciation, c1, with a
correspondingly reduced inflation rate (cf. point C with A).If thereisa high degreeof capital nobility in th sytern,the
numentary equilibrium rate of inflation will rut be given by the line XX,
ho:ever,butratherby the combination of e andp thatkeepthe asset
marketin balance over time (line 7Z in Figure 4).
This can be obtained by time differentiation of equation (9), leading
to an asset equilibrium rate of real depreciation e —p=, where is
a positive function of the rate of change of real credit (c), central hank
inte'vcntion in reserves (LA), and the rate of change of expectations (c)2
and depends negatively on the basic balance AB).
In Figure 4 the intercept of LZ on the p axis measures-.IfZZ
happens to coincide with the line XX (ç is then positive), the system is
in full steady state equilibrium at A. if LZ lies to the left and above
XX, however, there may bea differencebetween the rate of inflation that
keepsthe asset market inbalance and that which is propagated by the real
economy, at any given announced rate of depreciation (compare the point E
with A).23If left to itself, the fall in T will gradually shift the U
curvedown towards XX. Nowsuppose that the ZZ curve is deliberately
shifted up toits position in Figure 4 through a credit squeeze, and by
allowingreserves to fall(—AA >0).At the same time the authorities
preannounce a lower rate of depreciation (c. <c2).Equilibrium can now
take place at a lower rate of inflation (m < atthe point B), providing
thesesteps are credible.24If thestabilization program also affects the
realeconomy, is brought down to while the crawl and the expected
inflation rate are further reduced (point 0).At this stage the economy
may be ready for renewed growth (raise c, E)anda shift to a new long-run
rate of devaluation (c1)atC.
The sequence of steps A-B-D-C may be a more feasible one to achieve
than an attempt at a direct move from A to C. The main difference is that
one uses the exchange rate much moredrasticallyas a stabilizing device
(at D, is almost zero), but one pays the cost in terms of short-tern debt(or loss of reserves).This is an eple in ihich short-tena capi tal
flows are deliberately used as a stabilizing device at the expense of long-
tenii signalling.The main problem in practice is the speed at which these
adjustments can be made so as to be credible and the size of the real social
cost in terms of transitional production and employment slodown.Footno tes
Helpfulcoriients by PudigerDornbusch andother participantsat the
Conference aregratefullyacknowledged.
2 The typical loan in the new post-19/3private capital market, even if
takenfor a long run investment purpose, is basically short--run in
nature, in so far as the interest rate has to be renegotiatedat
short--runintervals.
3 As noted in Diaz-AlejandrO's paper forthis Conference, this problem
wasalso relevant in the 1930s.
4 At a later stage we shall put total real banking credit,instead of
m, on the axis -seeSection V.
5 n and iTenterfirm asset market equilibrium (see below).
6 In this formulation we implicitly assume some i-cal wage (w) rigidity,
in which case the labour market need not clear.In a fully flexible
wage case one should include —[as the alternative parameter in U1
assuming full employment.The basic form of equation (1) would
remain the same.The negative sign placed on K makes the vector U1
- consistonly of positive shift factors.
7 For simplicity we ignore the need to modify (2) henthe commodity
market is not balanced.Actually the NX line should have a kink at
the point of intersection with QQ.When Qd <QS,imports are a
function of Qd which in turn depends positively on in.
8 When we are in a multiple-tariff world, this need no longerbe the
case. Sometimes a tariff-cutting process may actually improvethe
current account.Even the case schematically given here, where
there may be a common tariff on imports which isdifferent from the
export subsidy, could lead to thisresult.
9 The demand for government bonds (Bg) is not specified separately
since it can be derived as a residual once total assetdemand (supply)
is given. If the latter is denoted by a, we get from (3)and (4) that-23-
9 (Contd.)
the deiand for real bonds (bd) is : bd =a-(i)Q[l + k (c) ].
10 Wedifferfrom their presentation in using the pair of real variables
(q,in)on the axes rather than the nominal e and p and having T.
separate from the goods market.The capital flow term in their paper
is written directly as a function of the interest differential
Li (j* + c)j.Thereis someadvantagein relating the capital flow
to the underlying asset behaviour.
ii Ifone adds B on theLHS weget total financial assets(M +eZ+
B9)
as financed from the three major sources: the basic balance (eB), the
governmentdeficit (Cg + B9), and the banking system finance to the
private sector (C + Ce).
12 An exactly analogous situation would be created by an inflationary
shift in the commOdity market.Suppose we start at B on QQ' andNX'
and for some reason (e.g. an increase in the budget deficit or in the
real wage) QQ' shifts inwards to QQ.Assuming the line AB to be on
a 450 vector, inflation will move the economy back to equilibrium
at A.From here on the analysis is the same.
13 Equilibrium at H or at E here implies a fall in real balances from
to M0/p1 through a price rise.
14 Strictly speaking equilibrium will probably take place at a point
right of F (since now Q = < QS)•
15 This may sometimes take the formofactive government encouragement
to firms to take foreign credit which is expensive from a social
point of view but is relatively cheap given the prevailing higher
domestic interest rates.
16 The analysis was conducted with a given commodity market curve. When
QQ shifts inwards due to a rise in inflationary expectations or in
real ages these problcms are clearly accentuated.-24-
17In thersraeli case the crawl irig peg was operated for twoyears,
betweenJune 1975 and October 1917, and atfirst follo'ed rather rigid
rulesbut then became quite flexible in teniis of size of change and
allowedfrequencyof adjustment (see Bruno and Sussrrian, 1930).
18 g.It maybeeasier to convince the tradeunions of the need to
forego one step in the indexation mechanism in a national crisis
situation thantoreduce indexation on a conti nijous basis.
19 Note, however, that the impos ition of a tax on capi tal importshas
anothernegativeby—product in the form of high domestic interest
rateswhich may harminvestment.The movmrent from A to C obviously
involvesa real credit squeeze whichmay be voluntary, through a fall
inC, or involuntary, through inflation.
20 Ifwewritep=e+(1—)w+d,wyp+wegetp.+ae
wherea =n,= nrd+ (1)2j, andr = Li - (1- a 1
ifand only if y = 1.This can also be expanded to incorporate real
balance effects.
21If wedenotethe autonomous time shift of 11 byand the elasticity
of T with respect to q by onecan show that c +
22 1A and Ewillbe zero in equilibrium, but appear here since they can
be used as policy instruments, along with c.
23 One could argue that in this case the expected rate of inflation may
beT3 while the actual rate is 1r2. If is maintained and expecta-
tions play an important role, actual inflation may gradually rise above
2(doesthis accord with developments during a hyperinflation?).
24 Also in line with the previous footnote -inflationmay for a time
rise above2 before it eventually comes down to rr.References
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